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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, criticism of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) has increased from all sides while a series of severe
aviation accidents has fueled public concern over the safety of domestic
air travel.1 Much of this criticism, some of it new, some of it not-so-
new, has focused on three areas.
First, as noted by both the White House and Republican leaders on
Capitol Hill, FAA regulations "impose[ ] a massive cumulative burden
on airlines and have a direct and adverse impact on airlines' financial
condition and [on] the air transportation system as a whole.' 2 Some of
this burden is due to the simple fact that new regulations generally do not
replace old ones, but instead are simply added on top of the existing
1 CLINTON V. OSTER, JR. Er AL., WHY AIRPLANES CRASH 3-4 (1992).
2 Ways to Reduce Unfiunded Federal Mandates and Regulatory Burdens on the Aviation
Industry Without Affecting the Safety of the Traveling Public: Hearing Before the Subconmn.
on Aviation of the House Comn. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104th Cong. 1-2
(1995) (statement of John J. Duncan, Comm. Chairman) [hereinafter Unfided Federal
Mandates].
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regulations. 3 By some estimates, federal mandates cost the airline indus-
try upwards of $500 million annually. 4
Second, the FAA is slow in keeping pace with technology. Not
only do many regulations lag far behind the state-of-the-art and thus fail
to mandate the most effective or efficient means of promoting safety,5
but FAA employees simply lack much of the expertise needed to regulate
the airline industry.6 At a recent hearing on airline safety, Senator Larry
Pressler noted the FAA's "tombstone effect," and went on to assert that
the FAA's failure to implement safety-enhancing programs in a timely
manner resulted in several fatal airplane crashes.7 Furthermore, the FAA
is so understaffed that whatever regulations it does implement are un-
likely to be closely monitored by inspectors. 8
Third, the FAA is not only faced with internal conflicts of interest,
but it also creates conflicts of interest in airlines and in aircraft manufac-
turers. For example, the FAA is charged under the Federal Aviation Act
with the often competing goals of promoting air safety and encouraging
the development of civil aeronautics and air commerce.9 Regarding con-
flicts in the airlines themselves, the FAA does not carry out most detailed
inspection work. Instead, the FAA delegates most of it to airplane manu-
facturers I0 and to commercial carriers."
3 Robert W. Poole, Jr., Toward Safer Skies, in INSTEAD OF REGULATION 207, 227 (Rob-
ert W. Poole, Jr. ed., 1982). One rule, for example, requires airplanes to carry a paper copy of
the latest available weather report available for the destination city, seemingly unaware of the
advent of radio communications during flight. 14 C.F.R. § 121.687(b) (1996).
4 Unfunded Federal Mandates, supra note 2, at 9 (referring to a 1993 report by the
National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry).
5 Poole, supra note 3, at 223.
6 Unfunded Federal Mandates, supra note 2, at 95 (statement of James E. Landry, Pres-
ident, Air Transport Association of America). In fact, as early as 1980, experts warned that the
"FAA's competence was falling far behind that of its industry counterparts to the point that
FAA oversight of the new aircraft certification process was becoming superficial." In 1993,
the General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that this situation had not improved. Over-
sight Hearing on Aviation Safety: Hearing of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transp.,lO4th Cong. 28 (1995) (statement of Kenneth M. Mead, GAO Director, Transporta-
tion Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division) [hereinafter Over-
sight Hearing].
7 Oversight Hearing, supra note 6, at 3-4 (statement of Sen. Larry Pressler).
8 Id. at 30 (statement of Kenneth M. Mead) (In January 1995, the FAA had only "2,300
inspectors to oversee ongoing operations of 18,000 commercial and 184,000 active general
aviation aircraft; 4,800 repair stations; 640 pilot training schools; 190 maintenance schools;
and 665,000 active pilots.").
9 Poole, supra note 3, at 223.
10 Id. at 224. Some seventy percent of manufacturer-related inspection work is left to the
manufacturers themselves. Id.
1 Id. at 227-28. In particular, although FAA inspectors spot-check airlines' work on
occasion, most maintenance only needs to be supervised by an FAA-licensed mechanic who,
as an employee of the airline, is faced with a conflict of interest. Id. As a case-in-point of how
this system may breakdown, Eastern Airlines agreed in early 1991 to pay a $3.5 million judg-
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I In Washington, the recent political trend (which shows no signs of
abating) advocates federal budget deficit reduction through decreased
government expenditure. It is therefore befitting at this time to explore
new, less-costly means of achieving the same ends traditionally pursued
by government.
This Note proposes, in an effort to reduce both public and private
expenditure while maintaining airline safety, to replace some functions
of the FAA with a scheme of strict liability in tort. 12 The rest of the Note
proceeds as follows. Section II presents an overview of the laws gov-
erning air travel, first examining historical treatment of airline liability,
followed by discussion of the status quo. Section III presents a similar
overview of strict liability and its development from Common Law times
through the present. Section IV then introduces the concept of value-of-
life and discusses its current use by the courts and government agencies.
Next, Section V delineates a scheme for replacing many FAA safety reg-
ulations with a scheme of strict liability. In keeping with good scholar-
ship, this section also discusses some potential limitations and shortfalls
of the proposed scheme. Finally, Section VI concludes the Note with
some discussion on the applicability of the proposed scheme to other
industries.
II. AVIATION REGULATION AND LIABILITY
A. HISTORY OF AVIATION LAW AND REGULATION 13
Federal government regulation of domestic airplanes began with the
1925 Kelly Act granting the U.S. Postal Service the power to enter con-
tracts for mail carriage by air.14 Shortly thereafter, the Air Commerce
Act of 1926 established the Bureau of Air Commerce and charged it with
establishing airways between cities, installing landing beacons, publish-
ing maps, and disseminating weather information. 15 In 1938, Congress
ment for falsifying maintenance records to cover up its failure to perform required mainte-
nance. OSTER Er AL., supra note 1, at 20.
12 "'Strict liability' ... means liability that is imposed on an actor apart from either (1)
an intent [of the actor] to interfere with a legally protected interest without a legal justification
for doing so, or (2) a breach of a duty to exercise reasonable care, i.e., actionable negligence."
W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEET'ON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. Note, however, that a plaintiff asserting strict liability must
still allege and prove causation and damages. Andrew A. Lemmon, The Developing Doctrine
of Rylands v. Fletcher: Hazardous Waste Remediation Contractors Beware, 42 Loy. L. REV.
287, 289 (1996).
13 See generally PAUL S. DEMPSEY ET AL., 1 AVIATION LAW AND REGULATION §§ 1.01-
1.08 (1992) (providing a thorough discussion of the history of airline regulation).
14 Also known as the Air Mail Act, ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805 (1925). The Air Mail Act of
1934 then transferred this power to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Ch. 466, 48 Stat.
933 (1934).
15 Ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
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undertook the first of several reorganizations of federal regulatory over-
sight of aviation.
At that time, through the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Congress
established the Civil Aeronautics Authority and charged it with regulat-
ing both air-traffic and airfares. 16 Two years later, Congress divided the
Authority into the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration (CAA), charging the former with economic (fare
and market entry) regulation and the latter with air-traffic and safety reg-
ulation. 17 The CAA remained a part of the Department of Commerce
from this time until 1958 when Congress reorganized it as the independ-
ent Federal Aviation Agency. 18 In 1967, Congress then renamed this
agency as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and placed it
under the authority of the newly-formed Department of Transportation,19
where it remains today.20 The CAB continued to regulate the economics
of the airline industry until the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 phased-
out its power.21
B. CURRENT ROLES OF THE FAA
In its current state, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
two principal functions: management of the nation's air traffic control
(ATC) system 22 and promulgation and enforcement of regulations pro-
16 Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
17 Poole, supra note 3, at 210-11. The CAB's Bureau of Safety, later reorganized as the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), was charged with investigating aviation acci-
dents. DEMPSEY, supra note 13, § 3.08. The NTSB continues today in this investigatory role
and also makes safety recommendations to other government agencies (including the FAA)
which, although not having the force of law, have an eighty percent acceptance rate by these
agencies. DEMPSEY, supra note 13, at § 3.08.
18 Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
19 See Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966).
20 Poole, supra note 3, at 211.
21 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978). CAB authority over routes terminated in
December 1981, and its authority over fares terminated in January 1983. Id. at 1744-45. The
Department of Transportation, however, still maintains some economic authority over interna-
tional aviation with regards to antitrust and consumer protection matters. CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, POLICIES FOR THE DEREGULATED AIRLINE INDUSTRY 3 (1988) [hereinafter
CBO, POLICIES].
22 The ATC system is divided into three parts: air route traffic control, terminal traffic
control, and flight service stations. The FAA maintains a strong, largely exclusive, presence in
each of these areas. Air route traffic control (ARTC) is provided by FAA-run regional traffic
control centers (ARTCCs) throughout the United States; each center controls certain areas of
airspace, and travel through that airspace requires permission from controllers in the appropri-
ate center. Terminal traffic control is provided by the FAA at airports, and guides aircraft after
they leave ARTCC control, through landing, to their parking at the terminal gate. Flight ser-
vice stations provide services to primarily general aviation aircraft, including weather brief-
ings, communication with pilots flying under visual (not instrument-guided) flight, and aid to
pilots in distress. CBO, POLICIES, supra note 21, at 37-39.
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moting air safety.23 The FAA's safety efforts are embodied in the Fed-
eral Air Regulations (FARs), a weighty tome of stereotypical
governmental regulations. 24 For the most part, the FAA simply promul-
gates FARs dictating the minimum required safety standards, leaving to
aircraft manufacturers and operators the decision whether, and to what
extent, to exceed the requirements.25 With regards to aircraft design and
personnel qualifications, however, the FAA takes a more active role in
certifying and licensing. 26
Funding for the FAA's activities comes largely from two sources:
the Airport and Airway Trust Fund27 and Department of Transportation
general funds. 28 Trust Fund revenues accrue from a variety of air-travel
related sources, including excise taxes on tickets, fuel, and cargo.29 FAA
outlays include operation and maintenance of the ATC system and regu-
lation of air safety.30 Although the airport system is largely owned and
financed by local authorities, the FAA does provide some financial sup-
port in the form of loans and grants for infrastructure development.3 '
For fiscal year 1997, FAA operation costs are estimated to be $4.8
billion. In terms of revenues, $2.7 billion will be funded through the
Airway Trust Fund, while the remaining $2.1 billion will come from
U.S. Department of Transportation general revenues. 32 In terms of ex-
penditures, Congress allocated $487 million to be spent specifically on
operations for maintaining air safety through regulation and enforce-
ment.33 Note, however, that this figure does not include the portion of
the $333 million allocated to administrative overhead required to oversee
the regulation and enforcement operations. 34
23 Poole, supra note 3, at 209. In fact, Congress's principal purpose in creating the FAA
was promotion of safe air travel. National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v.
Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945, 960 (D.C. Cal. 1985), remanded on other grounds, 796 F.2d 276
(9th Cir. 1986).
24 As of January 1, 1996, FAA regulations covered approximately 1,800 pages of the
Code of Federal Regulations. Of these, some 850 pages were directed at the airlines them-
selves ("Subchapter C: Aircraft," §§ 21-49, covered 740 pages, while "Subchapter D: Air-
men," §§ 60-67, covered 110 pages). See 14 C.F.R. §§ 1-199 (1996). For an overview of the
FARs, see PAUL S. DEMPSEY ET AL., 2 AvIAION LAW AND REGULATION §12 (1992).
25 Poole, supra note 3. at 223.
26 Id. at 211-12.
27 See Tax, Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 325, 565
(1982) (establishing the Fund).
28 CBO, POLIcIES, supra note 21, at 39.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 42.
31 Id. at 44-45.
32 BUDGET OF THE UNIrED STATES GOvERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1997, Appendix 743
(1996) [hereinafter FY1997 BUDGET].
33 Id. at 744.
34 Id.
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C. CURRENT STATE OF AVIATION LAW
FAA safety regulations generally address one of six issues: pilot
certification, aircraft certification and regulation, mechanic licensing, air-
line licensing, air traffic control, and hazardous material transport.3 5 The
first four of these categories, being the focus of this Note, are briefly
discussed in turn:
• As regards pilot certification, the FAA regulates not
only pilots themselves, including their medical fit-
ness for flying, 36 but also the flight schools which
they must attend to obtain certification. 37
• Aircraft design regulations address three basic topics:
minimum safety design standards; production con-
formity with prototype design; and production main-
tenance standards needed to conform with required
safety levels. 38 These regulations also address the air
carrier's duty to inspect, maintain, overhaul, and re-
pair its aircraft in conformity with FAA standards. 39
" The FARs also establish several categories of
mechanic certification, each with an associated level
of autonomy/responsibility that may be granted to the
mechanic.40
• Despite the 1978 Deregulation Act's elimination of
most market entry and exit provisions, airlines are
still required to obtain a carrier certificate before be-
ginning domestic or international air service. 41 In
this vein, airlines must show "fitness" in the form of
managerial skills, appropriate financing, consumer
demand satisfaction, and willingness and ability to
comply with appropriate laws and regulations. 42
As noted in the introduction to this Note, all four of these types of
FAA regulations are under fire, whether for their unnecessary intrusion
into the air travel market or for their lack of effectiveness in achieving
their purported goals. Before examining this Note's proposed scheme
35 See generally DEMPSEY, supra note 24, § 12.
36 Id. § 12.10; 14 C.F.R. §§ 61 & 67 (1996).
37 DEMPSEY, supra note 24, §§ 12.01-12.17; 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.181-61.201, 141 (1996).
38 DEMPSEY, supra note 24, § 12.20; see 14 C.F.R. §§ 21-43 (1996).
39 DEMPSEY, supra note 24, § 12.27; 14 C.F.R. §§ 121-39 (1996).
40 14 C.F.R. §§ 65.71-65,105 (1996); see also DEMPSEY, supra note 24, §§ 12.31-12.35
(briefly outlining the requirements of and authorizations to the various categories).
41 Federal Aviation Act, supra note 18, §§ 401402 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A.
§§ 41,101 & 41,102 (West 1997)).
42 DEMPSEY, supra note 24, § 12.43; 49 U.S.C.A. § 41,102 (West 1997).
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for eliminating many of these regulations, the Note next presents a brief
overview of strict liability and its application to air travel.
I. OVERVIEW OF STRICT LIABILITY
A. HISTORY OF COMMON LAW STRicT LIABiLrrY
Strict liability developed under English common law as a system of
imposing liability on practitioners of inherently dangerous activities. 43
Traditionally, this definition encompassed the keeping of wild animals,
keeping of fire, and blasting, but also extended to any activity deemed by
the courts as unusual and abnormal in the community.44 The leading
case in this area, Rylands v. Fletcher,45 held that a defendant would be
liable for any damages resulting from an activity unduly dangerous and
inappropriate to the place where it was maintained.
Although a turning point in English law, Rylands initially received
mixed reaction in the United States by both state courts46 and legal schol-
ars.47 The Restatement (First) of Torts explicitly limited Rylands to "ul-
trahazardous activities. 4 8 This approach generally placed the ultimate
(financial) risk of engaging in new activities on the actors themselves,
rather than on the non-participating public.49 By the 1950s, however,
most state courts came to accept the Rylands rule, at least in some
respect.50
Aviation, as a fledgling activity, was regarded as posing a signifi-
cant threat to structures, individuals, and crops due to its inherent ul-
trahazardous nature.5 ' Thus, state courts and the Restatement 52 imposed
strict liability on aircraft operators, but only for ground damage.5 3 Pre-
sumably, the courts regarded air travel to be so hazardous that anyone
43 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, at 536-37.
44 Id.
45 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865) (water reservoir on the defendant's property broke due to
unusually heavy rainfall, flooding the plaintiff's fields).
46 See Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1871) and Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868)
(adopting the Rylands rule). Cf. Marshall v. Welwood, 38 NJ.L. 339 (1876); Brown v. Col-
lins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873); and Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873) (severely criticizing the
Rylands holding).
47 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REv. 652 (1873); Ezra Ripley
Thayer, Liability without Fault, 29 HARv. L. REv. 801 (1916).
48 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 519 (1938) ("[O]ne who carries on an ul-
trahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recog-
nize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting
thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utinost care is exer-
cised to prevent the harm.").
49 Lemmon, supra note 12, at 294.
50 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 78.
51 Id.
52 RESTATEmENT (FrsT) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. b (1938).
53 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 78.
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choosing to enter an airplane undertook such an assumption of risk as to
waive most legal rights.54 A position in favor of strict liability was simi-
larly adopted by the drafters of the 1922 Uniform Aeronautics Act.55
The Act was withdrawn in 1943, however, in recognition of safety im-
provements in air travel. 56 Although the Restatement (Second) still tech-
nically considers flying to be an ultrahazardous activity, 57 Prosser &
Keeton suggest a division in current common law between standard fly-
ing (to which a negligence standard is applied) and unusual flying, such
as stunt flying, crop dusting, and flying of experimental aircraft (to
which strict liability is applied). 58
B. LEGISLATIVELY-MANDATED STRICT LIABILITY
In 1908, Congress passed the first strict liability law in the form of a
workmen's compensation scheme for U.S. government employees.59
Two years later, New York state followed suit with a workmen's com-
pensation law covering all workers in the state, civil servants or other-
wise.60 Most states passed similar laws soon thereafter, and currently all
fifty states have some scheme of strict liability workmen's
compensation. 61
All these laws are true strict liability schemes in that they bar claims
of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant
rule, as defenses. 62 The only matters at issue are (1) whether the worker
and injury are within the scope of the act, and (2) what damages should
be awarded. 63 In fact, many workmen's compensation laws go into great
detail in specifying the monetary remuneration to be given.64
In 1906, Congress passed the first workmen's compensation law for
common carriers; in this case, the law applied to railroads for injuries to
their employees. 65 However, the United States Supreme Court declared
the act unconstitutional as being outside the scope of the Commerce
54 See id. § 78 (stating that flying was "regarded at first [as] the province exclusively of
venturesome fools").
55 UNIF. AERONAUTICS ACT § 5, 9 U.L.A. 17 (MIsc. UNIF. ACTS) (Edward Thompson
Co. 1932) (act withdrawn 1943).
56 Id. at xvi.
57 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A cmt. c (1977).
58 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 78.
59 Id. § 80.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.101 (West 1993) (specifying, for example, for an injury
producing a "temporary total disability," compensation equal to 66-2/3 percent of the worker's
weekly wage at the time of injury).
65 Federal Employer's Liability Act, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906).
[Vol. 6:421
AIR SAFETY
Clause.6 6 In 1908, the law was rewritten,67 so as to apply only to em-
ployees involved in interstate or international commerce and was subse-
quently upheld by the Supreme Court.68 On its face, the Act required
some negligence on the part of the employer, so it was, in a sense, not a
true strict liability scheme.69 However, several Supreme Court rulings
have made the Act much more similar to being a true strict liability
scheme. 70
One recent study credits this law, the Federal Employer's Liability
Act (FELA), with saving some 32,000 lives over seventy-two years.71
Another study shows that the general shift from a negligence system to a
workers' compensation regime in the 1910s significantly reduced work
fatality rates.72 In this vein, a recent study by Professors Moore and
Viscusi demonstrates that a shift from negligence liability to a workers'
compensation scheme reduces workplace fatalities by about 33 percent. 73
In 1893, Congress passed the first national strict liability non-work-
men's compensation law in the form of the Federal Safety Appliance
Act.74 Still in effect today, the law requires railroads involved in inter-
state commerce to utilize certain safety devices on their trains. 75 Any
rail carrier acting deficiently is held strictly liable for injury to its own
employees or to others.76
66 Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
67 Ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60 (West 1996)).
68 Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1911).
69 Ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65, supra note 67 (creating liability for damages "resulting in whole
or in part from the negligence" of a railroad's employees).
70 Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio Rail Co., 372 U.S. 108, 120 (1963) (employer must
compensate the employee for even improbable or unexpectedly severe consequences of a
wrongful act; in this case, an insect bite); Webb v. Illinois Cent. Rail Co., 352 U.S. 512, 516
(1957); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (employer's negligence
need only play the "slightest" part in causing the employee's injury).
71 Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377, 391 (1994) (citing Lars A. Stole, The Economic Effects
of Liability Rules on Railroad Employee Accidents: 1890-1970 (1992) (unpublished manu-
script on file with Gary T. Schwartz)).
72 James R. Chelius, Liability for Industrial Accidents: A Comparison of Negligence and
Strict Liability Systems, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 293, 303, 306 (1976).
73 MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. Ki' Viscusi, COMPENSATION MECHANISM FOR JOB RISKS
133 (1990).
74 Federal Safety Appliance Act, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C.A. §§ 20,301-20,304, 21,304 (West 1997)).
75 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 20,302 (West 1997).
76 See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 80 and cases cited at 45 U.S.C.A.
§ 1, n.19 (West 1996). Cf. Price V. Fishback, Liability Rules and Accident Prevention in the
Workplace: Empirical Evidence from the Early Twentieth Century, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 305
(1987) (finding an increase in the accident rate after the shift to strict liability). Gary T.
Schwartz notes, however, that this increase may be simply the result of increased willingness
of employees to file claims. Schwartz, supra note 72, at 393 n.74.
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C. STRICT LIABILITY IN THE COURTS
Even where not mandated by law, strict liability continues to ex-
pand into new areas of activity. Courts often rationalize that strict tort
liability provides manufacturers with incentives to improve the safety of
their products. 77 As a result, courts have extended the doctrine to electric
utilities78 and commercial automobile lessors.79
Indicative of this general trend towards broader application of strict
liability, the Second Restatement abandons the "ultrahazardous" litmus
test in lieu of a six-factor test used to determine the degree of dangerous-
ness of the activity.80 In addition, the Restatement advocates strict liabil-
ity for defective products, 8 ' largely codifying the seminal holding of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.82 Although not elaborating on
the application of this section to air travel, the Restatement (Second)
does note that airplane passengers should be considered "user[s]" for the
77 Roger W. Holmes, Strict Products Liability for Electric Utility Companies: A Surge in
the Wrong Direction, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 161, 171-72, n.60 (1995) (citing Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 1982); Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours,
345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); and Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168,
171-72 (Cal. 1964)).
78 Holmes, supra note 77, at 162 n.7.
79 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 212 A.2d 769, 781 (N.J. 1965).
80 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). In full, the Section states:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors
are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land, or chattels of
others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977). In full, the Section states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
82 377 P.2d 897 (1963) (manufacturer of power tool held strictly liable in tort for injuries
sustained by the plaintiff as a result of a defect in the design and manufacture of the tool).
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purposes of the section.83 In this vein, this section of the Restatement
has at times been applied to air travel by various state courts.84
Commercial aviation is no longer considered an ultrahazardous ac-
tivity for passengers and thus not subject to strict liability.85 Even
ground damage is generally no longer subject to strict liability claims.86
However, air carriers must still maintain a very high degree of care when
transporting the public.8 7 As a result, carriers will be liable for the
slightest negligence proximately causing injury or damage to persons or
property. 88 In addition, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ("the thing
speaks for itself") has been widely applied to airline accidents.8 9 Fur-
thermore, some courts have held violations of the FARs to be negligence
as a matter of law.90 In all, the application of these common law doc-
trines makes carrier liability appear strikingly similar to common-law
imposed strict liability.
However, there exists no federal tort law governing air carrier or
manufacturer liability; state law controls the matter.91 In this vein, the
Tenth Circuit stated in Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp. that Congress,
in granting the CAB the power to promulgate safety regulations, in-
tended for a mutual coexistence of state common law remedies and fed-
eral regulation of air travel, at least with regards to aircraft design, if not
for aircraft operations as well. 92 As a result, compliance with federal
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1977).
84 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Tex Sun Beechcraft, Inc., No. 05-91-00956-CV, 1992
WL 86624 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (fatigue fracture, due to water soluble decals attached to the
propeller, held to be a defect); and Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 592 P.2d 175 (N.M.
1979) (airplane leased without oil in the engine held to be "defective" within the meaning of
§ 402A).
85 DEMPSEY, supra note 24, § 13.11.
86 William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 1705,
1747 (1992).
87 DEMPSEY, supra note 24, § 13.11 (citing PAUL S. DEMPSEY & WILLIAM E. THOMS,
LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION IN TRANSPORTATION 255-75 (1986)).
88 Id. (citing Haldane v. Alaska Airlines, 126 F.Supp. 224, 226 (D. Alaska 1954)).
89 DEMPSEY, supra note 24, § 13.12.
90 DEMPSEY, supra note 24, § 13.14 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286
(1977); Rathvon v. Columbia Pac. Airlines, 633 P.2d 122 (Wash. App. 1981); Farnsworth v.
Steiner, 601 P.2d 266 (Alaska 1979); and Todd v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla.
1974)).
91 Patrick. J. Shea, Note, Solving America's General Aviation Crisis: The Advantages of
Federal Preemption over Tort Reform, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 747, 763 (1995). See also Mary
A. Wells & David G. Mayhan, Federal Preemption of Strict Liability Claims in Aviation Liti-
gation: A Fresh Look, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 693 (1992) (providing a general overview of
federal preemption law and its recent application by the courts).
92 985 F.2d 1438, 1444 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908 (1993) ("Con-
gress... intended to allow state common law to stand side by side with the system of federal
regulations it has developed."). As Cleveland dealt with design standards, it is unclear
whether the court would have held operation regulations to be non-preemptive as well. See
also Shea, supra note 91, at 779-80 (discussing the court's reasoning in Cleveland).
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aviation safety standards does not preempt tort suits under state law, and
thus, air carriers and manufacturers consistently face law suits for air
mishaps, regardless of their compliance with the FARs. 93
IV. VALUE-OF-LIFE
Although the term "value-of-life" is charged with moral and philo-
sophical connotations, it need not be so.94 To an economist or govern-
ment regulator, the concept of value-of-life is invaluable for performing
accurate cost-benefit analyses involving (on the cost side) the risk of
death or injury.95 In this vein, "fatal risk reduction values," as value-of-
life estimates are euphemistically referred to by the federal government,
are used by such agencies as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
Department of Transportation (within which the FAA resides).96 Simi-
larly, value-of-life estimates may be used by courts in assessing damages
to be awarded to a tort victim's survivor.97
A. METHODS OF VALUING LIFE
Two common schemes exist for assessing the value of human life:
the human-capital approach, and the willingness-to-pay approach.
The human-capital approach, the oldest method for valuing life, is
based on Adam Smith's assertion that a person's monetary value is equal
to the value of his lifetime output.98 In this vein, an accident victim's
93 Shea, supra note 91, at 763.
94 Geoffrey L. Gillis & Stephen J. Spurr, The Value of Life in Tort Litigation: the Advent
of the Economic Approach, 75 MICH. B.J. 540 (1996).
95 See W. Kip Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for Judging Risk Regulation
Policies, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 431 (1995) (outlining the basic cost-benefit approach to regu-
lation and the use of value-of-life estimates therein); but see [JuSTICE] STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) (recasting
traditional economic tests that use value-of-life figures in ways that avoid the need for such
estimates).
96 Gillis & Spurr, supra note 94, at 540. For a comprehensive account of value-of-life
estimates used by government agencies, see Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes of Age,
83 Nw. U. L. Rv. 876, 886-91 (1989).
97 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 197 (4th ed. 1992). See, e.g.,
Pasquale v. Ohio Power Co., 418 S.E.2d 738, 753-56 (W. Va. 1992) (holding, in a civil wrong-
ful death action, that the value of a decedent's life is a permissible argument, and that the
simple lost-wage method of calculation is not the only monetary way in which the value-of-life
may be calculated). Cf. Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hosp., 345 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1986) (hold-
ing that the West Virginia wrongful death statute explicitly forbids value-of-life measure-
ments, and impliedly rationalizing that this must be the case since such a value is infinite).
98 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 30-31 (Edwin Canaan ed., 1937) (1st ed.
1776).
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value-of-life is based on her earning potential.99 This figure, in turn, is
determined through economic forecasts of her future earnings.' 00
One can apply this method with relative ease on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Thus, the human-capital approach is well-suited to assessing the
amount of compensation that should be provided after an accident to a
victim's next-of-kin to restore his or her economic well-being. As a re-
sult, this method was traditionally used at common law.10'
However, the method has its shortcomings. First, the accuracy of
the value-of-life calculated is only as accurate as the forecasts of future
earnings. Thus, the method is largely inapplicable to children for whom
no reliable income forecasting is available. 102
Second, the human-capital approach has a different theoretical basis
than that behind regulatory cost-benefit analysis. The approach is largely
backward-looking in that it aims to recreate the past (ex post) by re-
turning the victim's next-of-kin to his or her pre-death economic status
quo. Regulatory cost-benefit analysis, on the other hand, aims to save
lives ex ante. This foundational difference reduces the method's applica-
bility to regulatory cost-benefit analysis insofar as individuals value past
(ex post) and anticipated (ex ante) losses differently. In this regard, many
studies have shown that individuals demand less compensation ex post
than ex ante.'03
Another popular method for valuing life is the willingness-to-pay
approach. This method, which avoids both shortcomings of the human-
capital approach, determines the value-of-life by assessing the implicit
value that individuals place on their own lives. This value, in turn, is
based on individuals' willingness to purchase safety-enhancing devices
(e.g., smoke detectors or automobile air bags) and/or their demand for
financial compensation for undertaking risky activities (e.g., coal mining
99 Id.
100 POSNER, supra note 97, at 198.
101 Gillis & Spurr, supra note 94, at 540.
102 POSNER, supra note 97, at 183.
103 For two seminal papers on this topic, see Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 193 (1991); and
Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,
98 . POL. EcON. 1325 (1990).
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or underwater welding).' °4 Scientific studies estimating the value-of-life
tend to use this approach.10 5
One significant shortcoming of this approach, however, is that it
generally fails to take into account the individual characteristics of the
decedent and instead relies on aggregate data. 10 6 Some individualization
is available, however, insofar a the value-of-life may be based on a sub-
set of the population at large-e.g., airplane passengers, coal miners,
etc.107 In addition, the method suffers from "selectivity bias" in that in-
dividuals may make their choices with imperfect information, often un-
derestimating the risk of harm, and therefore tending to undervalue their
lives.10 8 Regardless, insofar as this approach calculates ex ante value-of-
life, it is better suited to regulatory situations than the ex post human-
capital approach.
B. EMPIRICAL VALUES OF LIFE
In 1993, Professor Kip Viscusi surveyed some twenty-five willing-
ness-to-pay studies of the value-of-life.' 0 9 He asserts in his article that,
although the value estimates in these studies vary widely depending on
the characteristics of the populations exposed to the risk, reasonable esti-
mates of the value-of-life cluster in the $3 million to $7 million range. I 10
On the low end of the spectrum, the FAA assesses the value of a
single life at $1.5 million."1 Other agencies, on the other hand, implic-
itly place a much higher value on life. For example, Occupational Safety
and Heath Administration (OSHA) asbestos regulations cost $89 million
per life saved." 2 Thus, if OSHA were to use standard benefit-cost anal-
ysis in determining whether to implement these regulations, it must
either value life as worth upwards of $89 million or grossly undervalue
the costs of regulatory implementation.
104 Id. at 198. For further reading on this method, see Craig A. Olson, An Analysis of
Wage Differentials Received by Workers on Dangerous Jobs, 16 J. HUM. RESOURCES 167
(1981); Rachel Dardis, The Value of Life: New Evidence from the Marketplace, 70 AM. ECON.
R. 1077 (1980); and RICHARD THALER & SHERWIN ROSEN, THE VALUE OF SAVING A LIE:
EVIDENCE FROM THE LABOR MARKET IN HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 265
(Nestor E. Terleckyj ed., 1975). For general background, see M.W. JONES-LEE, THE VALUE
OF LIFE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1976); and Richard Zeckhauser, Procedures for Valuing
Lives, 23 PUB. POL'Y 419 (1975).
105 Gillis & Spurr, supra note 94, at 540-41.
106 Id. at 541.
107 Id. at 542.
108 Id. at 541-42.
109 W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. EON. LIT. 1912 (1993).
110 Id. at 1942.
111 RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, COLLISION COURSE: THE TRUTH ABOUT AIRLINE
SAFETY 37 (1994). Also see this book for a harsh criticism of current FAA policies and
practices.
112 Viscusi, supra note 109, at 1912-13.
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V. A PLAN FOR FAA REFORM
It is often difficult, if not impossible, to assign a single cause to an
air accident since many accidents have several contributing factors.113
One congressional study concludes that only a fraction of fatal air acci-
dents can be attributed to a single cause. 114 Recognizing this problem,
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) classifies accidents by
a variety of methods, including causes, factors involved, and the se-
quence of events leading up to the accident."I 5 However, in order sim-
plify the end result of the investigatory process, the NTSB ultimately
categorizes aircraft accidents by the first occurrence in the chain of
events that caused the accident.' 16
Faced with the complexity of the NTSB's investigatory reports, on
one hand, and the over-simplicity of its final categorizations, several
studies of accidents have established their own categories, based on the
overall focus and/or needs of the study." 7 Similarly, this Note estab-
lishes its own three categories of contributory factors:
* Failure of equipment under the operational and/or
maintenance control of the airline (equipment
failure);
* Error by airline personnel, or by personnel directly
responsible to the airline (personnel error); and
* All other error and/or failures (other error).
With this background established, this Note proposes the following
scheme of airline deregulation:
* Elimination of all FAA standards governing air car-
rier equipment, pilot conduct, and company
operations;I 8
1 t3 OSrER ET AL., supra note 1, at 25.
114 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssEssMErr, U.S. CONGRESS, SAFE SKIES FOR TOMORROW
96 (1988) [hereinafter SAFE SKIES].
115 Id. at 95.
116 Id.
117 See, e.g., SAFE SKIES, supra note 114, at 96-97 (The Office of Technology Assessment
established twenty categories based on type and, in some instances, sequence of errors); but
see OsmR ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-29 (establishing only nine categories, based only on the
type of causal factor (equipment, pilot error, air traffic control error, etc.)).
118 Certain FAA regulatory functions not affected by this scheme are necessary for setting
standards that lead to greater safety. For example, the FAA determines the protocol to be used
in airplane-to-airplane communications. These coordination efforts should not be eliminated,
since the FAA's role here is as a market facilitator, not as a regulator per se.
Similarly, the FAA should remain a regulator of airports, to a certain extent, where it is
not efficient for a single airline to operate alone. Thus, control tower personnel and equipment
should remain under the guidance of the FAA. Were this otherwise, a free-rider problem
would result and expenditure in these areas of common-benefit would be less than optimal.
Generally speaking, equipment and/or personnel which serve one airline alone should be
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" Enactment of a scheme for strict liability in tort, pay-
able to the injured or the decedent's next of kin, if
injury to person or property is attributable to either
equipment failure and/or personnel error (where
some "other error" contributed to the mishap, liability
will be assessed in proportion to the contribution by
the air carrier's equipment and/or personnel);
• Determination, by the National Transportation Safety
Board,1 9 of an appropriate value-of-life (the calcula-
tion of which is discussed below); and
• Establishment of standards for minimum insurance to
be carried by airlines (either through an independent
insurer or through self-insurance by the carrier).
In 1988, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) com-
pleted a survey of thirty-five fatal air accidents occurring between 1975
and 1986.120 To each accident, the OTA attributed one or more causal
factors, and determined one of them to be the initiating causal factor.12'
Applying the OTA's results to the three categories established by this
Note, the OTA found 57 percent of fatal accidents to be caused, at least
in part, by personnel error, with 34 percent for equipment failure. 22
When categorizing these fatal accidents by initiating causal factor alone,
the OTA found personnel error to be the initiating factor in 43 percent of
the accidents, with equipment failure accounting for 26 percent.1 23
These figures tend to demonstrate that factors entirely under the control
of the air carrier are a contributory factor in a very high percentage of
fatal air accidents.
A. AIR CARRIER BEHAVIOR UNDER THE SCHEME
Faced with such a strict liability scheme for their actions, air carriers
will perform cost-benefit analyses to determine whether to institute a par-
ticular safety-enhancing measure. An example will elucidate this point.
First, assume that an independent company just introduced a new and
improved ground proximity warning device having a present-discounted
owned/employed by only that airline, with strict liability directed at that airline. Resources
that cannot be equitably or efficiently allocated to a single airline should remain under FAA
guidance.
119 It is preferable for the NTSB, rather than the FAA, to choose the value-of-life due to
the FAA's internal conflicts of interest, as noted in Section I, supra.
120 SAFE SKIES, supra note 114, at 96-97.
121 Id. at 97.
122 SAFE SKIEs, supra note 114, at 97 Table 5-4.
123 Id.
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cost of purchase and upkeep of $100,000.124 Second, assume that the
NTSB determines the value-of-life to be $1 million for the purposes of
the strict liability scheme proposed.
The airline, in performing a cost-benefit analysis for whether it
should purchase and install the new device, will compare (1) the present-
discounted value of the cost of the device against (2) the probability-
adjusted present-discounted value of lives saved.' 25 Mathematically, the
airline will seek to determine whether C (the total cost of the device) is
less than PV (the benefits), where P equals the probability that one life
will be saved by the device, 126 and V equals the value-of-life set by the
NTSB. The airline will install the new device if (and only if) the costs
are less than the probability-adjusted value of lives saved; i.e., if C < PV.
Applying the numbers assumed above, the airline will install the
new device if the probability of it saving one life is greater than ten
percent; i.e., if P > 0.1. Under this Note's scheme, the determination of
this probability will be left up to the airline. This approach is consistent
with the Note's argument that airlines themselves are better equipped and
better informed than government regulators at determining the usefulness
of equipment and the like. As a result, the NTSB's only means of affect-
ing an airline's actions is to alter the value-of-life.
If, for instance, the NTSB sets the value-of-life to be only $10,000,
an airline would only install the new warning device if P equals 10; i.e.,
only if is certain that the device will save ten lives. On the other hand, if
the NTSB sets the value of life at $10 million, the airline will install the
device if the probability of it saving a single life is merely one percent.
Thus, through its official determination of the value-of-life, the NTSB
can significantly alter the choices made by the airlines.
If the NTSB chooses a low value-of-life, an airline will maintain
only minimal safety standards. However, if the NTSB instead selects a
high value-of-life, the potential tort liability to the airline will be high,
and thus it will choose a higher level of safety. This scheme therefore
permits the NTSB to largely determine, through its value-of-life figure
alone, the level of safety maintained by the airlines. This process may
then be used to counterbalance industry underestimation of the benefits
124 It is necessary to assume, in this simple example, that the device is independently
developed and marketed. If, on the other hand, the airline sponsored the research and develop-
ment of the device and shared in its earnings, that fact would have to enter into the cost-benefit
analysis.
125 See POSNER, supra note 97, at 160-61, 164 (explaining cost-benefit analysis by way of
Judge Hand's opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947)).
126 Where the device will save more than one life, P can be adjusted appropriately to a
value greater than one. For example, if a device is expected to save (on average) five lives
over its operational life, the probability (P) of it saving one life equals five.
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of safety measures and/or short-sightedness on the part of the airline in-
dustry (in terms of amortizing expenditures over time).
B. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE SCHEME
1. Advantages
There are four significant advantages to this proposal, vis-t-vis the
current system of regulation and inspection. First, costs of writing and
enforcing regulations are eliminated. The only additional costs are those
required to set an appropriate value-of-life. Since this value is currently
calculated by the FAA, the framework is already in place, and thus, in-
cremental costs are probably minimal.
Second, the scheme places most decision-making power directly in
the hands of the individuals who possess the greatest knowledge-the
airlines themselves. It is a well-founded tenet of modem economic the-
ory that information costs can have an appreciable impact on transaction
costs and market efficiency.' 27 As a result, economic efficiency is maxi-
mized when decisions are left to the individuals who possess the greatest
knowledge concerning an issue.
Third, the scheme reduces litigation costs since negligence issues no
longer need to be decided by the courts. Causation matters will probably
still be disputed. However, total litigation costs should fall.
Fourth, the scheme need not increase safety and maintenance costs
to the airlines. In choosing a high value-of-life, the NTSB may inspire
airlines to incur additional costs. However, at least theoretically, the
NTSB can choose a value-of-life that maintains the same level of safety
and maintenance as is currently in place. Furthermore, the scheme may,
in fact, reduce overall safety and maintenance costs by granting airlines
the freedom to choose the most cost-effective safety and maintenance
methods.
2. Disadvantages
There are some potential disadvantages to this proposal. However,
they can be mitigated by fine tuning and/or stylizing the proposed
scheme. Furthermore, any disadvantages that remain should be offset by
the gains noted above.
First, an overestimate of the value-of-life set by the NTSB will re-
sult in additional expenditure by the airlines. Nonetheless, this potential
problem may be lessened through more accurate, detailed, and rigorous
valuation. Second, lack of FAA regulations and/or regulatory guidance
127 A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12-13 (2d ed.
1989).
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may increase airline costs by requiring them to hire personnel to perform
the cost-benefit analyses previously undertaken by the FAA.
Third, consumer anxiety is likely to increase. This problem, how-
ever, can be largely alleviated through a public relations campaign aimed
at explaining the new scheme and its overall advantages-how it will
reduce prices with no loss of safety. In addition, the FAA has come
under public fire recently for failing to prevent airline tragedies.128 Thus,
the public is probably willing to accept a new system for maintaining
airline safety.
VI. CONCLUSION
The commercial airline industry is an ideal candidate for the strict
liability scheme proposed for several reasons, of which some are unique
to airlines, others are not. For one, airlines are heavily regulated with
regards to safety. Thus, the potential efficiency gains from deregulation
are high.
Second, consumers' control over their own safety is minimal-pas-
sengers have no role in flying the airplane, and their safety role is largely
limited to fastening their seatbelts. Thus, contributory negligence is
rarely an issue in assessing liability.
Third, airline travel does not, for the most part, result in positive
externalities 129 requiring government intervention. Phrased alternatively,
air travel does not result in such gains for the common good that the
government needs to intervene to promote a higher level of supply than
would occur without intervention.130 Furthermore, any such externalities
may be captured under other laws, non-unique to aviation (i.e., patent,
copyright, etc.).
Other industries possessing some or all of these characteristics, and
thus potential candidates for similar strict liability schemes, are:
" Railroads and other mass-transit systems (both pas-
senger and freight);
* Prescription and over-the-counter medications
(although the potential for consumer contributory
negligence may make strict liability impractical
here); and
128 The FAA Should Inspect Itself, Editorial, WASH. POST, May 23, 1996, at A20. See
also The FAA's Self-Inspection, Editorial, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1996, at A18.
129 "An 'external economy' [a.k.a. positive externality] is defined as a favorable effect on
one or more persons that emanates from the action of a different person or firm." PAUL A.
SAMUiELSON, ECONOMICS 474 (9th ed. 1973).
130 Id. at 474-75.
1997]
440 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6:421
* Medical malpractice (although losses of positive ex-
ternalities may outweigh efficiency gains from
deregulation).
With regards to air travel, at least, the time has come to reevaluate
the FAA's role in regulation. Although its role in coordinating air traffic
is (probably) a worthy one, its regulation of the internal operations of
commercial air carriers is not only an unnecessary drain on the nation's
pocketbook but is financially taxing to air commerce and the economy as
a whole. The same level of air safety can be maintained, at significant
savings, through a carefully-crafted system of strict liability.
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